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BANKRUPTCY AND WORKERS: 
RISKS, COMPENSATION AND PENSION 
CONTRACTS 
RICHARD A. IPPOLITO* 
ABSTRACT 
One can view workers from the perspective of the portfolios they hold. 
For most workers, this portfolio, broadly defined, evinces a heavy 
concentration of assets in the firm that employs them. They stand to incur 
wage reductions if they move to some other company midway in the contract 
because much of the human capital that they hold is not fully transferable. In 
many cases, they also stand to lose substantial pension value, and may lose 
other benefits as well, such as health insurance, longer vacation periods 
earned through seniority and so on. This just means that they are party to a 
risky venture, where the downside outcome poses substantial losses. It turns 
out that the broad implications of bankruptcy for workers are well indexed by 
pension losses, which means that an understanding of the pension 
implications of bankruptcy also conveys the thrust of non-pension losses as 
well. 
Risk is not a free good. As in standard models of finance, firms are 
expected to pay for the risks they impose on workers, and indeed, are 
expected to pay premia in excess of those implied in financial models if they 
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expose workers to non-diversified risks. The latter premium makes sense 
only if firms believe that heavily exposed workers are more likely to work 
hard to ensure the continued viability of their employer. If this incentive is 
sufficiently strong then higher productivity finances the additional risk 
premia. Workers can choose jobs among employers that pose different levels 
of bankruptcy risks, and those least willing to undertake risk take jobs with 
relatively low levels of it, and receive commensurately lower pay. 
As such, there is no reason to believe that workers’ losses in some 
bankrupt companies raise special public policy concerns. Most workers at 
risk experience the upside potential; a small percentage experiences the 
downside. There is no reason to believe that the contracts ex ante are 
inefficient. But if the government may have to assume responsibility for near 
destitute older workers, then this prospect might give rise to various 
mandatory insurance schemes. Even if these insurances are not market 
priced, the participants at least have to pay some of the costs of the exposure 
they incur. This may be one reason why institutions like unemployment 
compensation and pension insurance arise. 
The compensating differential model used to explain the risk-reward 
tradeoff inherent in defined benefit pension plans also can explain their 
demise. Beginning in the mid 1980s, the federal government altered its 
traditional bonding role in the contract and, instead, permitted firms to 
unilaterally terminate defined benefit plans and take excess assets (those in 
excess of termination benefits) into corporate profits. This had the result of 
exogenously increasing the probability of termination far greater than 
bankruptcy risks. Workers were (justifiably) more leery of the pension 
promise, which reduced the amount that they were willing to pay for it. The 
plans, therefore, are valued by less than it cost the companies to provide 
them, which creates the incentive to move towards pension plans that are self 
bonded, such as 401k plans. 
401k plans have dominated pension growth for the past twenty years and 
are fast becoming the pension plan of choice in the (non-union) private 
sector. While they eliminate the bankruptcy risks inherent in defined benefit 
plans, they create their own set of bankruptcy exposures. While most workers 
covered by these plans do not invest in company stock, about one in ten have 
at least half their account balances concentrated in the securities issued by the 
firm that employs them. In many large companies, 401k plans are heavily 
invested in company stock. These investment patterns can give rise to the 
potential for catastrophic losses for workers late in their career. In order to 
protect themselves from ex post bailouts, taxpayers may want to give some 
thought to enforcing some set of minimum diversification rules in these 
plans.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The cost of bankruptcy can be large and can affect a wide assortment of 
stakeholders. Owing to the principle of diversification, however, most 
stakeholders do not view the bankruptcy of a single firm as a watershed 
event. Its effect on most stockholders’ and bondholders’ portfolio returns is 
small. Similarly, banks, suppliers and other creditors are only slightly 
affected by the few customers that default on outstanding credit. Indeed, the 
malaise of most stakeholders in firm performance is at the core of discussions 
of so-called agency problems inherent in the concept of diversification. 
Workers are an important exception. The typical worker’s asset portfolio 
is more heavily impacted by bankruptcy of his employer. Some of these 
assets are not directly affected by the financial condition of their employer: 
for example, home equity and the present value of their acquired rights to 
collect social security payouts. For the most part, the returns on these assets 
are independent of the idiosyncratic performance of their employer. 
Beyond these assets, the typical employee does not maintain large 
diversified holdings of financial assets.1 Indeed, his principle holdings take 
the form of the equivalent of company-issued securities, the return on which 
depends mostly (or completely) on the financial success of his employer. 
These assets can be characterized as “employment assets,” and “pension 
wealth.”  
II. EMPLOYMENT AS AN ASSET 
Lifetime job security in current employment is a valuable asset. The asset 
value equals the present value of current compensation minus the present 
value of the next best alternative. To illustrate, imagine a randomly chosen 
fifty-year-old employee with twenty years of service in some firm. Let C 
denote the present value of his future compensation in his current job until 
retirement age (including future wages, pension accruals and the value of all 
other fringe benefits).  
Imagine that he becomes unemployed. Suppose that he considers all 
available employment opportunities in all geographic locations. He calculates 
the present value of future compensation from each of these alternatives, 
inclusive of pension, vacation time, health benefits and so on. He then 
subtracts the cost of moving to his hypothetical new firm.  
 1. See, e.g., DAVID WISE & STEPHEN F. VENTI, THE WEALTH OF COHORTS: RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND THE CHANGING ASSETS OF OLDER AMERICANS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 4600, 1993). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In some cases, moving costs are small. In others, it may involve moving 
geographical location, which gives rise to out-of-pocket costs and 
opportunity costs in the form of lost intimacy with family and friends. He 
also subtracts the lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in his job 
search. Call these “adjustment costs” and denote these as A. Let him choose 
the alternative which gives him the greatest net benefit, denoted by D. The 
value of employment in the current job is E, where E = C – (D – A). 
This asset value cannot be negative; if it were, employees would be better 
off moving to a new job, and therefore would do so voluntarily. Since they 
did not, presumably there is a net positive asset value in the current job. 
There are several reasons why alternative wages might be lower than the 
wage in current employment. One is that employees sometimes gain an 
expertise in working in a particular firm. For example, Jane has worked with 
the same people for a long time, and really knows how to create teams that 
work best together for different types of jobs. The firm may highly value her 
gift and pays her accordingly, so as to encourage her continued employment. 
But this value completely evaporates once she moves to a new firm 
populated with strangers. If she involuntarily leaves this job, she may have 
no particular advantage in motivating workers she knows nothing about. 
Similarly, firms in bankruptcy often are in industries that generally evince 
poor performance, and all may be shedding workers. In this case, workers 
may have difficulty finding jobs that utilize a skill they have in working 
particular machines and so forth. 
Moreover, the labor market is beset with information problems. Firms 
know that of all job seekers, some may not be as productive as their prior 
wage level suggests. Jane’s firm-specific knowledge is one reason. Another 
is that many firms offer a kind of wage insurance, meaning that over a 
lifetime of work in the firm, some members of a cohort may become 
relatively less productive than their peers as they age (perhaps owing to 
health problems or inability to assimilate new technology and the like). 
The notion of wage insurance means that, up front, everyone agrees that 
those who become less productive when older may get paid less than those 
that are more productive, but the difference does not fully reflect their 
productivity differential. This means that some unemployed workers who 
were earning high wages are not worthy of these amounts in an ex post sense. 
Fearing getting stuck with high-paid unproductive employees, firms hiring in 
the job market protect themselves from these outcomes by offering relatively 
low wages for new entrants until sufficient time elapses for firms themselves 
to make an informed determination.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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For all these reasons, if bankruptcy results in unemployment then workers 
absorb this capital loss. One would expect that these employment losses are 
largest in firms and industries where tenure tends to be long. That is, if long 
tenure is valuable to the production process then firms will tend to erect 
compensation schemes (like defined benefit pension plans) that discourage 
quitting. So, employment losses and pension losses are expected to be 
positively correlated.  
For this reason, discussion of pension losses may take on disproportionate 
importance. These losses are larger in some plans than others. I will 
concentrate my attention on defined benefit pensions, which are fairly 
common in most large bankruptcies. In cases where the firm is dissolved then 
pension termination is automatic. If reorganization is attempted then the 
pension also can be terminated if the bankruptcy judge deems pension 
termination necessary to the success of a reorganization plan. Termination 
triggers immediate losses for covered workers. Some of these benefits are 
insured. The uninsured pension benefits are “pension capital losses.” I will 
discuss the notion of losses in defined contribution plans below, but for now I 
will develop the losses inherent in defined benefit plans, and highlight the 
nature of the defined benefit contract. 
III. DEFAULT EXPOSURE: THE ESSENCE OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
CONTRACTS 
Contingent benefits are the core of defined benefit plans. If the plan does 
not terminate then workers at retirement are entitled to a benefit that is 
indexed to final wage.2 This is called an “ongoing” benefit. But if termination 
occurs earlier than retirement then workers are entitled to a “termination” or 
“legal” benefit, which is payable at retirement but is indexed to the wage on 
the date of termination. The difference between these calculations is called 
the contingent benefit, or default exposure. 
This exposure is easy to model, but more difficult to rationalize in an 
employee contract. It also is non-trivial to value, owing to its peculiar loss 
structure and imposition of undiversified exposure on workers. Whatever 
price workers pay for this asset, however, they are willing to pay less the 
greater their estimate that the plan will terminate prior to their retirement 
date.  
 2. In many plans, the final wage is the average of the “high-3” or “high-5,” but in pension 
nomenclature, these are known as “final salary” plans, and are usually modeled as though the benefit 
was indexed to the last wage. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. The Defined Benefit Pension Contract 
Consider a simple two-period model. There is one period of work 
followed by a period of retirement. Bankruptcies occur at the end of period 
one. Workers receive their cash wage at the beginning of period one. They 
receive their pension at the beginning of period two. The pension award is 
L(1+i) if the firm survives, where L is the present value of the pension award 
at the beginning of period one, and i is the interest rate. If the firm does not 
survive then workers receive the portion of the pension that is guaranteed. 
The guarantee takes the form of the nominal pension benefit, L (it is not 
adjusted for the time value of money). This guarantee mimics the insurance 
offered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”). 
Ongoing versus Termination Pensions. In actuarial parlance, the 
amount L(1+i) is the projected benefit amount payable in period two. The 
amount L is the termination value, also payable in period two. It is useful to 
express these amounts as of the beginning of period one because we are 
looking at the value of the pension in an ex ante sense. The present value of 
ongoing pension, L, is written as follows: 
(1)
i
LiL +
+=
1
)1(
. 
The present value of the termination pension (or equivalently the insured 
value) equals some percent Ω of the projected pension, which is entirely 
dependent on the interest rate: 
(1a)
i
whereLL +=ΩΩ= 1
1,* . 
Contingent Benefits. This PBGC charges a premium to cover some of 
the costs of the insurance, but there is a large implied federal subsidy that 
covers most of its cost. For simplicity, assume that the federal subsidy 
represents a sufficiently large portion of pension insurance that workers can 
ignore its cost. All bankruptcies occur at the end of period one. If probability 
of bankruptcy is p, then the expected present value of the pension at the 
beginning of period one is described as follows: 
(2) . ( )[ ]*1* LLpLEV −−+=
The first term is the guaranteed pension. The term in square brackets is 
the contingent pension benefit. It is collectable if the firm avoids bankruptcy. 
Hence, this term is multiplied by the probability that the firm survives, 1–p.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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Compensating Differential. The natural question arises: How much less 
valuable is this pension amount compared to the ongoing pension benefit? To 
obtain the answer, and to express the answer in percentage terms, subtract (2) 
from (1), and divide by ongoing pension value: 
(3) .
L
EVLx −=  
The parameter, x, is the discount factor that accounts for the uncertainty 
of collecting the pension (as a percent of the ongoing pension value). 
Substituting (2) into (3) gives the expression in terms of the underlying 
parameters in the model:  
(4) .  )1( Ω−= px
Workers do not obtain pensions for free. They sacrifice cash wages in 
exchange for the pension promise. How much they are willing to sacrifice 
depends on the probability of bankruptcy and the portion of pensions that are 
insured. If either the probability of bankruptcy is zero (p = 0) or the 
insurance is complete (Ω = 1), then the discount factor, x, is zero. The 
discount factor increases with the probability of bankruptcy and decreases 
with the portion of pension that is insured (which is inversely related to the 
interest rate). 
If one starts with the assumption that workers sacrifice wages in the 
amount, L, to obtain a pension with certainty, then they require a rebate in the 
amount, xL, in consideration of accepting the risk that they might receive a 
lesser amount upon a bankruptcy, which occurs with probability, p, which 
just says that workers require compensation for accepting risk.  
Risk Aversion. If workers are risk averse then the expression in (4) is an 
understatement of the compensation they require to accept a pension of 
uncertain value. Bondholders looking at the same probability of bankruptcy 
require no more compensation than implied in (4) because they are widely 
diversified across many bond issues. In contrast, contingent pension benefits 
represent an important component of workers’ asset positions, which they 
cannot diversify away. They therefore discount the uncertain pension by an 
amount larger than implied in (4). The reason is risk aversion. As long as the 
marginal utility of wealth is diminishing, then the cost of the downside 
outcome is higher than the benefit of the upside outcome.  
Suppose that workers all have utility functions that increase with the 
square root of wealth. Assume that they have no other wealth in retirement. 
Ask the question: What is the certainty equivalent pension, say LC, that gives 
the worker the same expected utility from receiving pension L with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1251 Ippolito book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1251 
 
 
 
 
probability p and a pension L* with probability p? I write this equality as 
follows: 
(4a) LpLpLC )1(* −+= . 
Express LC in terms of ongoing benefits, hence, LC = (1-y)L, where y is 
the percent discount that accounts for bankruptcy and risk aversion. Also 
express L* in terms of L from (1a), and solve for y to obtain: 
(5) 2])1([1 ppy −+Ω−= . 
The discount factor y accommodates both the reduction in expected 
pension wealth generated by uncertainty and risk aversion, which has the 
effect of leveraging the required discount for uncertainty. 
The latter effect is easiest to see if I suppose that the insured portion of the 
pension approximates zero (which is akin to assuming a very high interest 
rate). In this case (5) reduces to the following expression: 
(6) ,if Ω ~ 0. )1( ppxy −+=
The first component of y is the regular discount for expected losses from 
bankruptcy, x. The second component, p(1-p), is the added compensation for 
risk aversion. Unless bankruptcy risk is exceptionally large, the risk aversion 
premium is increasing with the probability of bankruptcy.3  
B. The Economics of Default Risk in the Employee Contract 
Default risk is not a “natural” extension of a defined benefit plan. The 
firm can eliminate workers’ exposure to pension default risk by funding the 
plan for ongoing liabilities and writing the contract in a way that awards 
workers the property rights to pension assets up to ongoing benefits. If firms 
preferred this approach then the PBGC would never receive a claim. 
Virtually all firms elect to limit workers’ property rights to termination 
benefits. Firms explicitly expose workers to default risk in the event that they 
encounter serious financial difficulty. Put differently, workers are secured 
bondholders in the firm up to the amount of termination pension liabilities, 
L*. They are unsecured bondholders up to the amount, L - L*. The value of 
 
 
 3. As long at the probability of bankruptcy is less than one-half, then the premium is increasing 
in p. But if p exceeds .5 then the premium is decreasing in p. The reason is that at either extreme (p=0 
or p=1) there is no uncertainty. The maximum amount of uncertainty (meaning that the variance of 
outcomes is highest) when p = ½.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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the unsecured debt instrument is payable if the firm avoids serious financial 
difficulty.4 
This is a somewhat puzzling phenomenon. The firm can obtain unsecured 
credit at market interest rates that are appropriate for their level of default 
risk. Since idiosyncratic default risk is diversifiable, the market interest rate 
equals the riskless rate plus expected default losses.5 But workers do not have 
lots of jobs, nor do they have the opportunity to hold shares in a diversified 
portfolio of pensions in different firms. Workers are extraordinarily exposed 
to non-diversified risks in the firm that employs them.6  
In the context of my simple two-period model, the extra compensation 
that the firm must pay workers to accept non-diversified default risk is given 
in the second term in expression (6). Why do firms pay this premium? 
One obvious explanation is that the firm calculates that at-risk workers 
are less likely to pose agency risk on the firm. It is apparent how the bond 
makes sense when workers are unionized; because in this instance, workers 
can act in concert and may find it optimal to hold up stockholders midway in 
the contract. The prospect of large losses upon bankruptcy discourages this 
calculus. I have made this argument elsewhere.7  
Even if workers are not unionized, the impact of the bond on workers’ 
productivity is not zero. If workers as a group have a common stake in the 
financial success of the firm then presumably they will create an environment 
in which either shirking or an “anti-management” attitude is frowned upon. If 
workers’ risk exposure can reduce default risks sufficiently, then the higher 
expected value of the firm’s financial performance can more than pay for the 
extra risk exposure. In effect, the impending bankruptcy losses bond workers 
 4. Perhaps, we could think of workers as either “super” unsecured bondholders, in the sense that 
the bond can be made valueless upon the firm encountering a condition short of bankruptcy, or 
alternatively as workers selling a call option to the firm that comes into the money upon the firm 
encountering a serious financial condition. In a continuous model, options are not typically offered for 
more than a year or two in the future; longer term protection is not available. 
 5. In the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model then if it is more likely for bankruptcies to 
occur in poor economic conditions then the beta value on these securities is positive, and thus, there is 
some additional compensation paid to investors to accept the risk of losses when the market portfolio 
is “down.” 
 6. One could imagine workers purchasing options that come into the money when the firm 
enters bankruptcy, but these options unlikely would trade at rates that merely reflect expected default 
losses, because the existence of the widespread use of options creates a moral hazard. Moreover, in a 
multi-period model, the market in options only goes out a couple years, and so it is not possible to buy 
protection against the possibility that the firm will enter bankruptcy many years in the future. Options 
are more like term life insurance. Workers want a product akin to term-renewable life insurance. 
 7. Richard A. Ippolito, The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 611 (1985). 
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to work harder to help the firm attain long-term success. This prospect in turn 
reduces the probability that the firm experiences the downside outcome. 
IV. SUMMARY OF CONTRACTUAL ISSUES 
Workers are under long-term contract with the firm. The contract makes 
workers part owners by virtue of the fact that their lifetime compensation 
depends on the firm’s success. Compensation levels must be sufficiently high 
to accommodate both expected default losses and non-diversifiable risk. The 
latter cost is offset by higher expected productivity of workers whose 
commitment to the firm is bonded by large losses imposed by firm failure.  
Workers can opt to work in an environment in which default risk is either 
zero or close to zero; that is, they could work for a local, state or federal 
government, all of which are virtually immune from bankruptcy risk and 
pension default. One expects pay in the public sector to be commensurately 
lower. In short, there is a risk-reward tradeoff in the labor market, one that is 
almost a perfect parallel to the risk principles in standard models of finance.  
In financial markets, Treasury issues are the standards of comparison. 
They are default-free investments. Corporate bonds carry default risks, and 
thus, pay higher interest rates. Similarly, one expects a higher overall 
compensation level in firms that promise uncertain pension benefits. Indeed, 
one expects compensation differentials to exceed the expected default 
amounts because workers are forced to hold undiversified risk. Workers are 
intensely invested in the firm that employs them, and must be compensated 
accordingly. 
Workers not only are exposed to pension risk, but also to the employment 
risk that I discussed at the beginning of this Article. Workers expect to be 
paid a lower wage if they involuntarily change jobs mid career. In short, 
workers stand to lose substantial amounts of their overall lifetime wealth if 
bankruptcy visits the firm that employs them. But exposure to this risk is the 
price that workers pay in exchange for higher pay; or, viewed the other way, 
workers are compensated for the bankruptcy risks they face. 
Upon bankruptcy, we observe workers who experience the downside 
outcome of the contract. Most workers at risk avoid this fate. Workers in 
general are compensated ex ante for their exposures, and thus, it is not 
apparent that special public policy implications arise for those who 
experience the downside. The outcome is parallel to an investor who chooses 
to hold an all-stock portfolio and experiences the downside outcome. Ex 
ante, the investor chooses a higher risk exposure and expects a higher return. 
Large losses are a potential outcome of this strategy.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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The outcome is parallel to contract solutions in jobs where workers are 
exposed to health hazards. One can work in a job environment that is mostly 
free of potential harm owing to health hazards. If workers are unaware of the 
hazards (say, it is not obvious that fumes pose long-term risks of harm) then 
one can argue that tort remedies can be useful to encourage efficient harm 
reduction. If workers are aware of hazards on the job then pay differentials 
are expected to develop to compensate workers for accepting this risk. If 
harm visits them later on, then a tort remedy effectively compensates 
workers twice: once in the form of a risk premium, and again upon insuring 
the event that they were paid to be exposed to in the first place.8  
Bankruptcies are not common in firms that offer defined benefit plans. 
Over the period 1980 to 1997, the typical worker in a firm that sponsored at 
least one defined benefit plan had about twenty-eight chances in one 
thousand that the sponsor entered bankruptcy in any single year.9 Over a 
thirty-year career, this amounts to about eight chances in one hundred. As I 
show below, workers who stand to suffer the largest pension losses upon 
termination lose an amount equal to about two years of wages.10 While this is 
a relatively large amount for most workers, it is substantially smaller than it 
would be if defined benefit plans were uninsured. Without insurance, if firms 
had no pension funding, losses for older workers could reach five or six times 
their annual wage. Worst still, these losses would be most severe for older 
workers with lots of accumulated benefits. 
One can reasonably speculate that like victims of natural disasters, big 
pension losers in bankrupt firms pose an ex post threat to taxpayers as a 
whole. Even though they enter a risky contract with commensurately higher 
pay, they may have an incentive to renege ex post. As large “innocent” losers 
in a bankruptcy, they perhaps are sympathetic petitioners for a bailout from 
Congress. The prospect of their success may be one reason why mandatory 
pension insurance exists. As I show below, taxpayers implicitly underwrite a 
substantial portion of the cost of the insurance, but at least they are successful 
in getting the beneficiaries of the insurance to pay some of the expected 
costs. Similar arguments can be made for the case of unemployment 
insurance.  
 8. In the longer run, the prospects of tort remedies eliminate the pay differential up front—even 
if workers are fully informed about risks. 
 9. This is the average bankruptcy rate among publicly-traded firms in the Compustat database 
that sponsored at least one defined benefit plan, weighted by employment.  
 10. Loss amount also depends on the interest rate as shown below. 
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To limit their losses ex post, taxpayers may want to impose minimum 
quality restrictions on the employment contract. Effectively, they require tie-
in contracts that pair pensions with pension insurance and employment with 
unemployment insurance. Because the uninsured risk profile is inherently 
unstable upon the arrival of downside events, the amount of risks that 
workers can undertake is regulated. In a market that has the benefit of full 
information and is free of government bailouts, it is not clear that there is any 
rationale to interfere with workers’ free choice of the risk profiles in their 
jobs. But since taxpayers bear hidden underwriting risks in contracts with 
large downside potential, they may have an interest in effectively 
participating in contract conditions ex ante. 
V. LOSSES IN A MULTI-PERIOD MODEL 
A two-period model adequately demonstrates the concept of contingent 
benefits, but misses the exposure profile over various ages for covered 
workers. It turns out that the multi-period model is only slightly more 
complex. Consider a defined benefit pension that pays a pension that has a 
lump sum valuation at retirement equal to α percent of the final wage, 
multiplied by years of service, S. Suppose I normalize age so that all workers 
start at age and service zero and retire after R periods. This allows me to 
represent age and service by a single variable, notably service, S. Thus, a 
worker with S years of service also is S years of age. Also assume that wage 
growth equals the interest rate. This simplifies the exposition of ongoing 
benefits and reasonably reflects growth rates in reality.11 At service level S, 
ongoing benefits are proportional to years of service accrued to date and 
current wage:12 
(8) SWSL α=  
where WS is the current wage and α is the pension’s generosity parameter. 
Termination benefits do not incorporate wage growth, and thus, equal 
some fraction, Ω, of ongoing benefits. In a two-period model, Ω is a function 
solely of the interest rate. In a multi-period model, it also depends on the 
age/service of the covered worker, specifically, 
 
 
 11. Nominal wage growth reflects inflation just as interest rates do. Wages also increase by a real 
component of a magnitude that is not much different than the real interest rate.  
 12. If wages grow at rate g then projected wages at retirement are WS(1+g)R-S, where R is 
retirement age, S is current age, and WS is current wage. To discount this wage to the present, divide by 
the factor (1+i)R-S, where i is the interest rate. If i=g then the growth and discount factors cancel, 
leaving only WS.  
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(9)
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SS i
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−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+=ΩΩ= 1
1,* . 
The factor, ΩS, carries a subscript, S, to denote that the fraction of the 
benefit that is contingent depends on the worker’s age/service level. Since 
retirement age, R, is a constant, the fraction of benefits insured, ΩS, is 
smallest at the start of tenure (when S ~ 0), and increases towards unity as the 
worker approaches retirement (when S ~ R). 
To obtain contingent pension benefits, CS, at age and service level S, 
expressed as a percent of the current wage, subtract (9) from (8), and divide 
by the wage rate:  
(10) ( ) SC SS αΩ−= 1 . 
This expression shows that losses over tenure are affected by two equally 
important terms, which are multiplicative: the share of benefits that is 
uninsured, 1 – ΩS, decreases with age/service, which works to reduce losses 
with service. In contrast, the value of the ongoing pension benefits, αS, 
increases with age/service, which works to increase losses. At the two 
extremes of service, one term or the other is small, and hence, losses are 
close to zero.  
Workers in mid career suffer the highest losses. These workers have a 
substantial level of service in the firm but are sufficiently far from retirement 
that termination benefits are substantially discounted relative to ongoing 
benefits. Figure 1 shows the contingent benefits described in (10) assuming 
that the interest rate is six percent, the pension awards a lump sum equal to 
twenty-five percent for each year of service (times final wage), and workers 
retire after thirty years of service.13 The schedule figure reveals the familiar 
hill-like pension losses that workers absorb from pension termination at 
various levels of service. 
 
 
 13. Normally, benefits are paid as an annuity. Using a lump-sum equivalent yields the same 
answer as long as the pension awards ad hoc cost of living increases to retain the same level of real 
benefit regardless of the level of inflation. The twenty-five percent generosity factor is equivalent to a 
two percent annuity for a worker who will collect benefits with no cost of living adjustments, 
discounted at six percent. 
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Figure 1 
Pension Capital Losses From Firm Failure: A Defined Benefit Plan 
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* Losses based on a 6% interest rate and wage growth rate; lump sum payoff at retirement 
using a typical generosity factor. 
These losses are non-trivial. Workers midstream in the contract stand to 
absorb pension losses in excess of two years of wage income. These losses 
increase with the interest rate.  
The hill-shape pension loss function likely mimics the qualitative nature 
of employment losses from bankruptcy. Workers with little service at the 
time of bankruptcy have not invested much in the firm, and thus, do not have 
much firm-specific capital to lose. Older workers nearing retirement have 
lots of specific human capital, but they have only a few years over which to 
incur wage losses. Those in the middle of the contract incur disproportionate 
exposure: they have lots of firm specific capital that generates high wages in 
their current job but stand to earn lower wages throughout the remainder of 
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their career. Total losses are the vertical summation of pension losses and all 
other employment losses from bankruptcy (not shown). 
VI. THE STOCK BONUS ALTERNATIVE 
The discussion above suggests that termination losses from an insured (or 
funded) defined benefit plan can be replicated by a stock bonus plan that 
permits diversification out of company stock. Expressing losses in the 
context of a stock bonus plan highlights the nature of losses in a defined 
benefit plan and also helps us think about exposure to bankruptcy losses in 
pensions other than defined benefit. 
A. Traditional Stock Bonus Plan 
In a stock bonus defined contribution plan, the firm deposits some portion 
of the wage into the worker’s pension account, which must be used to 
purchase company stock. I assume that the firm awards the worker a percent, 
γ, of wage each year, where I deliberately set this parameter to generate the 
same expected losses in a defined benefit plan midway in the contract. I 
assume in the illustration that stock value grows at the same rate as the 
interest rate.  
In reality, one would suppose that the asset position would increase at a 
rate that includes the equity premium, but I suppress this element of the 
model so as to be comparable with my treatment of defined benefit plans, 
which also should be discounted by something more than the interest rate. 
Indeed, as I show below, the contingent benefits in defined benefit plans 
ought to be discounted by something close to the expected stock return.  
The asset position in the stock bonus plan as a percent of wages grows 
linearly with service, which I depict in Figure 2. If the firm fails, I assume 
that the stock is worthless, and so, the worker loses the balance in his stock 
bonus account. Thus, the linear segment in the figure gives the capital loss 
from firm failure. For comparison, I juxtapose this exposure against potential 
losses in a defined benefit pension plan that is protected by PBGC insurance 
(hill-shaped schedule). 
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Figure 2 
Pension Losses: Defined Benefit Plan Versus Stock Bonus Plan 
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Notice that over the first half of tenure, my choice of the stock bonus 
savings parameter is such that the potential losses in the stock bonus plan 
from bankruptcy fairly well replicate those in the defined benefit plan. After 
this point, however, potential losses in the stock account implied by firm 
failure continue to escalate, and indeed, they swamp the capital losses in the 
defined benefit plans late in tenure.  
This comparison makes apparent that, in effect, workers in defined 
benefit plans gradually exchange their portfolio of unsecured bonds for one 
that has a progressively higher proportion of secured bonds. As workers 
approach retirement, their entire pension portfolio is secured. This changing 
pension portfolio composition, which is implicit in defined benefit plans, acts 
to temper losses for older workers in the event of firm failure. In contrast, 
losses from a stock bonus plan put the entirety of the pension value at risk 
late in tenure. In comparison to a defined benefit plan, the stock bonus plan 
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not only imposes more non-diversified risk on workers, but also concentrates 
it late in tenure, when workers might be least inclined to accept it; they are 
more like a defined benefit plan with no insurance and no funding. Thus, 
workers would demand additional risk premia to accept the stock bonus 
arrangement over as compared to their defined benefit plan.  
B. Stock Bonus Plan with Diversification  
The firm can alter the stock bonus plan so that it essentially replicates 
capital losses in the defined benefit plan. It can do this by permitting workers 
to gradually diversify their portfolio out of company stock. For example, the 
pension might provide that one hundred percent of a worker’s account must 
be invested in company stock until midway in the contract. Beyond this 
point, the plan allows higher-tenure workers to have a progressively higher 
portion invested in Treasury Bills.  
To illustrate, consider the stock bonus plan I portray in Figure 2. By 
choosing a contribution rate to the stock bonus plan equal to one-fifteenth of 
the wage, I generate bankruptcy losses in year fifteen so as to be equal to 
bankruptcy losses in the defined benefit plan. Now suppose that for any 
service level, S, greater than fifteen, the firm permits the worker to diversify 
the proportion (S/15) - 1 into Treasury bills. Until year fifteen, the worker’s 
pension is completely undiversified. But, by the time his service level 
reaches twenty, the worker can diversify one-third of his account into 
Treasury Bills; after service level twenty-five, he can have two-thirds in 
Bills, reaching 100 percent by age and service level thirty. 
The schedule marked by closed triangles in Figure 3 portrays the 
diversifiable stock bonus plan. For comparison, I show the capital loss 
function for the defined benefit plan it replaces as a light hill-like solid line. 
The stock bonus plan essentially mimics the default losses in the defined 
benefit plan. In this sense, the diversifiable stock bonus plan imposes the 
same exposure to workers as the defined benefit alternative.14 Both pensions 
imply the same compensating differential from workers (in the form of 
foregone wages), regardless of these parameters. 
 14. For more detail on the relationship between these two loss functions, see Richard A. Ippolito, 
Replicating Default Risk in a Defined-Benefit Plan, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 31 (2002). 
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Figure 3 
Pension Capital Losses From Firm Failure:  
A Stock Bonus DC Plan With Gradual Diversification 
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In short, a defined benefit pension is similar to a compensation scheme 
that gives workers a stake in a risk-free bond plus company stock, where the 
shares of these securities change over tenure according to a contractual 
formula. The equivalence of these contracts suggests that the appropriate 
term structure of discount rates to value pension promises is a vector of 
weighted mix of riskless rates and expected stock returns that accounts for 
changing weights over the career and for the extra risk premium for non-
diversifiable risk. 
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C. When the Non-Diversification Premium Is Not Paid  
Compensating differentials for non-diversifiable risks are expected only 
when the firm requires workers to hold it. Suppose that workers have a 
defined contribution plan, like a 401k plan. The company matches employee 
contributions on an x to 1 basis, where its contributions take the form of 
company stock. In this case, workers are expected to discount the value of 
these contributions more than they would if they were cash matches. But if 
the workers themselves opt to invest their contributions into company stock 
as well, then the market does not award compensation to workers who select 
themselves into a portfolio unusually concentrated in company stock. 
Workers who choose to be non-diversified do so without any compensating 
reward. 
VII. THE COSTS OF PENSION INSURANCE 
PBGC pension insurance is a substitute for funding. If pensions maintain 
sufficient assets to cover termination liabilities then pension insurance adds 
no value. Exposure is created when firms either maintain funding levels 
below termination benefits, or have a pension portfolio that has sufficient 
volatility to generate underfunding over a short period of time. If the private 
insurance market sold PBGC-like pension insurance, what factors would 
drive price? The differences between this hypothetical price schedule and the 
one actually assessed by the PBGC represents the various subsidies in the 
current system. 
A. The Role of Age/Service 
As suggested by Figure 1, the cost of insurance depends upon their age 
and service. Figure 4 reproduces pension losses with insurance. It also shows 
a linear schedule that represents the value of ongoing pension benefits. This 
schedule describes pension bankruptcy losses to covered workers if the plan 
is completely unfunded and there is no insurance.15  
 15. Losses in “top-hat” plans resemble this schedule. These plans are exempt from regulations 
and have no special tax-exempt status. They cover only the highest paid workers in the firm. Often 
benefits in these plans vest only at retirement and have no funding. 
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Figure 4 
Pension Capital Losses From Firm Failure: 
Maximum Losses Versus Losses with Insurance 
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The vertical distance between the linear schedule and the hill-shaped 
schedule is the maximum value of the insurance. It is apparent that the value 
of PBGC insurance is highest for older workers. For the typical covered 
worker with 15 years of service, losses with insurance depicted in the figure 
amount to 2.3 times his annual wage (a not unreasonable estimate of actual 
losses in many cases). Without insurance and without funding then upon a 
bankruptcy, the same worker stands to lose the entirety of his pension, or 3.8 
times his annual wage. For workers approaching thirty years of service, 
bankruptcy with neither insurance nor funding imposes losses equal to 7.5 
times a typical worker’s annual wage. Either insurance or full funding for 
termination benefits virtually eliminates these losses.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
p1251 Ippolito book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] BANKRUPTCY AND WORKERS 1271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The maximum cost of the insurance to the PBGC equals the vertical 
difference between these schedules. Clearly, the cost of the insurance is 
higher for firms with lots of older workers. The cost would of course shift 
down vertically as the plan’s funding ratio increased.  
B. Interest Rates 
The interest rate also is an important parameter of the value of pension 
insurance. At very high interest rates, termination benefits are virtually 
worthless, and thus, the cost of supplying the insurance is low. In contrast, if 
the interest rate is very low then the termination benefit is almost as high as 
ongoing benefits.16 In this case, the cost of insuring workers is high. Figure 5 
starkly demonstrates this point. It reproduces pension losses from Figure 1, 
which are based on a six percent interest rate (solid-line schedule). For 
comparison, it shows the losses recomputed assuming that the interest rate 
(and wage growth) are three percent (diamond-marker schedule) and twelve 
percent (solid-box-marker schedule). The higher the interest rate, the higher 
the pension capital losses from termination (and the lower the cost of 
providing the insurance).  
Intuitively, since termination pensions are frozen in nominal terms, but 
often payable many years in the future, their present value is low if the 
discount rate is high. Since projected benefits keep pace with wage growth, 
and wage growth usually is highly correlated with nominal interest rates, 
projected benefits are more or less insulated from interest rate changes. Thus, 
the difference between the ongoing benefit and the termination benefit (the 
capital pension losses) is highest when interest rates are very high and vice 
versa.  
 16. See expression (1a): 
i
whereLL +=ΩΩ= 1
1,* . 
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Figure 5 
Pension Losses with Insurance as a Function of the Interest Rate 
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C. Other Determinants of Market Pension Insurance Prices 
While it is intuitively obvious that the value of pension insurance depends 
on the funding ratio, it is also importantly dependent on the pension plan’s 
portfolio composition. At any given funding ratio, a portfolio comprised of 
stocks presents more risks to the PBGC than a portfolio of Treasury bonds. 
To understand the role of asset composition, one needs an important piece of 
information; namely, that bankruptcy probability depends on the overall 
performance of the economy. Some firms enter bankruptcy during high-
growth periods in the economy, but it is far more likely that the bankruptcy 
occurs during or following an economic downturn in the economy as a 
whole.  
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Now consider a pension plan that holds all stock in its portfolio. In good 
times, the value of the portfolio is high. But this is of no concern to the 
PBGC because in good times bankruptcy risks are small. In bad times, the 
portfolio value falls, and bankruptcy risks increase. The correlation of 
bankruptcy risks with poor performance of the economy as a whole generates 
important downside exposure to the PBGC. A pension that is fully funded for 
insured benefits and has an all-stock portfolio deservedly owes the insurer 
compensation for the exposure it creates. 
A plan presents essentially zero exposure to the PBGC if it is fully 
funded, and it holds a portfolio of high-grade corporate bonds (or Treasuries) 
of the same duration as its pension liabilities. Duration is a measure of the 
sensitivity of the value of some security to changes in the interest rate. If a 
pension plan’s termination liabilities fall by ten percent for each one 
percentage point increase in the interest rate, then the liabilities are said to 
have a duration of ten. If it also holds bonds in its asset portfolio that have 
duration ten, then the difference between liabilities and assets is invariant to 
the interest rate. It is said to be immunized against interest rate risk. A plan 
funded with Treasuries also is insulated from stock market risks and default 
risks.  
In contrast, suppose that the plan holds only equity in its portfolio. In this 
case, it is exposed to interest rate risks, and it is exposed to adverse stock 
returns. In this case, a plan poses zero risk to the PBGC only if it maintains 
sufficient overfunding to accommodate potential negative equity returns (and 
significant reductions in the interest rate).  
D. The Two-Period Model 
To illustrate the role of equity exposure, I reconsider the two-period 
model used above. Suppose that there are only two investment choices, 
Treasuries (of equal duration to liabilities), and a stock index fund. In my 
simple model, bankruptcies occur at the end of the first period (after 
everyone learns whether the economy is up or down during the period).  
Thinking about termination liabilities, recall that the sponsor must pay the 
nominal amount L in period two. If the sponsor purchases only Treasury 
bonds, it can guarantee funding of liabilities L by purchasing the amount of 
bonds, B0, equal to L/(1+i). At the end of period one, it will have earned the 
interest iB0 and thus have the amount B = B0(1+i) to pay off termination 
liabilities. There is neither default risk nor equity market risk. The PBGC has 
no exposure.  
Suppose instead that the sponsor buys some Treasury bonds that are 
valued at the amount B in period two. It also buys some stock valued at S0 at 
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the beginning of period one and S0(1+r) at the end of period one, where r is 
the excess rate of return on stock (that is, the return after adjusting for the 
time value of money). On the upside the return is positive, and on the 
downside it is negative. The present value of expected losses as of the 
beginning of period one, EL, is written as follows: 
(10)  ( )[ ] 0)1(*)( 00 ≥++−= SrBLrpEL
where p is the probability of bankruptcy, which itself depends on the stock 
return. If the stock return is high then the bankruptcy rate is low and vice 
versa. The term inside the square brackets is underfunding at the end of 
period one, which can be different than underfunding at the start of the period 
owing to performance in the equity market. The insurer receives no benefits 
if the plan becomes more than fully funded, and thus, expected losses are 
positive or zero. 
Dividing and multiplying by L* gives expected losses as a function of 
initial funding ratio, f, initial stock share in the portfolio, α, and the rate of 
return on stocks, r: 
(11) [ ] 0)1(*)( ≥−−= frfLrpEL α  
This expression tells us that the economic price of pension insurance is a 
product of three factors: the probability of bankruptcy, p, termination 
liabilities, L*, and the funding ratio upon termination in a downside (the term 
inside the square brackets). The first term inside brackets, 1-f, captures the 
role of initial underfunding on exposure. The second term, αrf, captures the 
subsequent effect of equity performance on exposure. If the economy 
performs poorly then r is negative and p(r) is high. 
If there is no stock in the portfolio (α = 0) then the potential underfunding 
ratio is completely captured by the initial underfunding ratio. To the extent 
that it holds stocks (α > 0) then underfunding also depends on the share of 
stock and the return on stock during the period. While it is tempting to think 
that the insurer benefits if stock returns are high, in reality, it does not. The 
reason is that bankruptcy risks are low when markets perform well. 
Bankruptcy risks are high precisely when returns are low, and especially 
when they are negative. Thus, there is an asymmetry in which the backers of 
the insurance “participate” in the benefits or costs of good or bad stock 
market performance.  
If the term in brackets is positive then the economic price for pension 
insurance is zero. For a plan that holds stocks, the initial funding ratio must 
exceed unity to generate zero expected costs. For example, suppose that the 
downside stock return is minus fifty percent, and the plan’s stock share is .5. 
Then the firm poses no risk to the PBGC if the starting funding ratio is at 
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least 133 percent. In other words, plans that hold stock must have a 
sufficiently large funding cushion to accommodate the potential for downside 
returns.  
The expression makes it apparent that the cost of pension insurance 
depends on the probability that a claim occurs, the starting funding ratio, the 
share of plan assets in stock, and the return on stocks when the downside 
occurs. In a continuous model that has many possible upside and downside 
returns, the expression becomes complex, but the character of the results 
remain the same. 
VIII. THE BETA COMPONENT IN PENSION INSURANCE 
Under normal conditions, ignoring the administrative costs of operating 
the insurance, the economic premium equals expected losses in (11). In the 
case of pension insurance, however, the market price is higher. Why? The 
answer lies in the correlation of claims with downturns in the economy. Put 
somewhat differently, the backers of the insurance (in this case the taxpayers 
ultimately) require a higher return to invest in the insurance for the same 
reason that stockholders require a higher expected return than bondholders. If 
all stocks moved randomly and independently then holding a diversified 
portfolio of individual stocks would yield an average return that had a 
miniscule variance. In this case, stock investors expect a return 
commensurate with a bond. In reality, a diversified portfolio of stocks has a 
very large variance because returns are correlated across stocks. This is the 
so-called market risk, which cannot be diversified away.  
While stockholders can diversify away idiosyncratic risk, they cannot 
eliminate market risk. Stock returns typically move in tandem, which creates 
nondiversifiable risks. Hence, they earn a so-called equity premium (vis a vis 
the bondholders). Put somewhat differently, holders of high-quality bonds 
accept a lower return than stockholders because it allows them to avoid 
volatility in portfolio value.17 This is the main implication of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), in which securities earn risk premiums only 
if they pose risks that cannot be diversified away.18 Stocks whose returns 
increase more than proportionally with the market (high-beta stocks) are 
expected to have higher returns than those whose returns increase less than 
 17. There is of course inflation risk in bonds, but one can imagine holding I-bonds issued by the 
U.S. Treasury, which pay a real interest rate plus inflation. These bonds have no inflation risks. As 
such, one expects a lower return on these securities. 
 18. The original article that presents CAPM is William Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of 
Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). 
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proportionally with the market (low-beta stocks). No one wants to lose a 
substantial portion of their portfolio in down times, and thus, stockholders 
must earn a higher premium relative to bondholders to obtain equilibrium in 
the financial markets. 
The same principle applies to insurance markets. When insurable events 
are mostly unrelated (for example, auto accident claims), average claims 
experience is characterized by a trivial variance, so long as the insurer covers 
many units of exposure. Even if exposure is correlated, as say in flood 
damage along the Mississippi River, the insurer can offer flood damage over 
many different areas of the country and indeed the world, and thus, diversify 
away these risks across a large number of insureds. Pension insurance claims 
not only are susceptible to bunching, but also are correlated (negatively) with 
the market return. The backers of the insurance are asked to pay out large 
claims precisely at times in which their portfolios are falling. Investors 
require a premium to underwrite this risk compared to underwriting risks that 
carry no market risk. Since the idea is directly related to the CAPM, it is said 
that pension insurance carries “beta” risk.19 
There are two components of beta risk in pension insurance. One arises 
because funding is a function of stock performance in all plans that hold 
stock investments, and the second arises because the probability of 
bankruptcy itself increases in down markets. Even if a plan holds only bonds 
but is underfunded, the probability that this underfunding becomes a PBGC 
claim is higher in down markets than up markets, and thus, the insurer’s loss 
exposure is negatively correlated with stock market returns.  
The beta risk itself gives rise to the possibility of catastrophic events. In 
periods in which economic performance is poor, the PBGC runs the risk that 
many bankruptcies can occur within a short period, each characterized by 
abnormally low funding levels. Even under normal economic conditions, the 
insurer is vulnerable to a few large claims arriving by chance, or to the 
downturn of an entire industry. Catastrophic exposure is characterized by the 
possibility of severe “tail” events, meaning a small probability of very large 
claims. These kinds of coverages are hard to offer because catastrophic 
 19. The notion of beta risk can be found, for example, in Stewart Myers & Richard Cohn, A 
Discounted Cash Flow Approach to Property-Liability Insurance Rate Regulation, in FAIR RATE OF 
RETURN IN PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE (J. David Cummins & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1987); J. 
David Cummins, Statistical and Financial Models of Insurance Pricing and the Insurance Firm, 58 J. 
RISK & INS. 261 (1991); William B. Farley, Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property 
Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results, 10 BELL J. ECON. 192 (1979); and Alan Kraus & 
Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Fair Profits for the Property Liability Insurance Firm, 37 J. 
FIN. 1015 (1982). 
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events by definition are rare, which restricts the usefulness of historic data for 
projecting claims.  
A. Illustration of the Catastrophic/Beta Event  
The claims experience over the brief history of the PBGC illustrates both 
the catastrophic and beta risk inherent in the insurance. Figure 6 shows 
claims taken by the insurer through 2003.20 The bar columns show nominal 
claims (measured along the left vertical axis). The line distribution shows the 
two-year rolling-average equity return on the S&P 500 Index (right vertical 
axis).  
Figure 6 
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 20. Historical PBGC data is found in the Pension Insurance Data Book, 2002, which is issued 
annually by the PBGC. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., PBGC PENSION INS. DATA BOOK 
2002, at 10 (2003). 
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Since 1970, there have been only two periods in which equity returns 
were sufficiently poor and persistent so as to generate a negative two-year 
return. The first was 1974, which captures the stock market crash of 
1973/1974 (the average returns in these two years was minus twenty percent 
per annum). I have argued elsewhere that the underfunding created by this 
event and the corresponding increase in bankruptcy rates were an important 
stimulus for the enactment of the insurance on Labor Day 1974.21  
Notably, the legislation creating the PBGC was not retroactive. It offered 
the insurance against claims arising in the future, which fortuitously, was 
characterized by a dramatic reversal in equity performance following the 
inauguration of the insurance. Indeed, stock returns generally were quite 
favorable for the insurance throughout the 1980s and 1990s, creating the 
impression that perhaps the insurance was not especially costly. Though 
premium rates were increased occasionally, total premiums rarely exceeded 
$1 billion per annum, and as of year-end 2000, the PBGC enjoyed a $9.7 
billion surplus position. It had not yet experienced the conditions that give 
rise to the catastrophic nature of the insurance, notably, a substantial 
downturn in the economy.  
Indeed, Figure 7 shows the distribution of insured pension liabilities by 
plan funding ratio as of the start of 2001, just prior to the downturn. The 
figure depicts little cause for alarm. Total underfunding amounted to only 
$31.2 billion. The figure adequately demonstrates the pitfall of gauging 
exposure by relying on spot funding ratios because they do not account for 
the protection of negative investment returns. Beginning in 2000, equity 
returns fell by almost forty percent through 2002, virtually reproducing the 
stock market crash of 1973/1974. Figure 8 demonstrates the effect of this 
downturn on plan underfunding. The chart shows two series of underfunding, 
one based on Form 5500 Annual Report Data and the other (since 1996) 
based on submissions to the PBGC which are required by plans with more 
than $50 million in underfunding. The “5500” data are as of the first of the 
year and measure vested liabilities only. The PBGC series pertains to 
measures as of September 30th of the year and include all liabilities, 
including unvested benefits. The PBGC series has the benefit that it is almost 
four years more current than 5500 data.  
 21. See Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, 31 J.L. & ECON. 85 (1988). The history surrounding the enactment of pension insurance 
can be found in James Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001). 
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Figure 7 
Funding Ratios Prior to Market Drop (January 1, 2001) 
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[Source:  2001 Form 5500 Annual Reports (Schedule B).] 
While the series evince some differences, it is apparent that pension plan 
underfunding ballooned starting in 2001, reaching a high of about $400 
billion in 2002.  
Unlike its inaugural experience, in which the PBGC escaped with 
relatively few claims following the economic downturn in the early 1970s, 
the agency did not escape the consequences of the negative equity returns 
starting in 2001. This time, it absorbed the full brunt of the bankruptcies and 
underfunding that accompanied the downside event.22 The PBGC quickly 
accumulated $15.9 billion in claims, more than twice as much as the $6.1 
billion it assumed over the period 1980–1999 ($9.5 billion in 2003 dollars). 
In real terms, per annum claims during the last three years were more than 
fifteen times the per annum claims over all prior years.  
 
 
 22. See supra fig.6. 
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Figure 8 
Pension Underfunding, 1980–2003 
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* The Form 5500 series funding ratios are as of January 1 of the year, and count vested 
liabilities only. Data are taken from Schedule B attachments. 
** The PBGC series pertain to September 30 of the year, and include all accrued liabilities.  
It obtains its data from firms who by law must divulge underfunding beyond $50 million (so-
called 4010 filings). 
Both series are adjusted to a common mortality table and both adjust to a common PBGC 
rate (though the interest rates for the same year can differ because the series are calculated at 
two different times of the year. 
The downside event erased the heretofore mentioned $9.7 billion surplus 
and replaced it with a deficit of $11.2 billion as of year end 2003, a reversal 
of positions amounting to $20.3 billion over the span of three years. More 
claims may yet materialize from this period. As of the end of 2003, 
underfunding stood at $350 billion and, of this, $83 billion was in plans 
sponsored by firms whose bonds were rated as “junk.”23  
 
 
 23. The numbers in this paragraph are found in the 2003 PBGC Annual Report. See PENSION 
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 2003 PBGC ANN. REP. 4–5 (2004) [hereinafter PBGC ANN. REP.]. 
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B. Future Possible Net Financial Positions 
The future PBGC position depends importantly on future economic 
conditions. Like most other insurers of catastrophic events, the PBGC uses a 
stochastic simulation model to capture the distribution of potential net 
financial outcomes. Essentially, because it lacks a large numbers of 
observations, the insurer of infrequent events uses information about what is 
known to affect losses to simulate future conditions. For example, insurance 
companies that cover hurricane damage use weather models to simulate 
thousands of possible spring hurricane seasons to determine the distribution 
of possible claims outcomes.  
The PBGC uses a complex model that accommodates stochastic 
movement in stock returns, interest rates, employment changes, bankruptcy 
rates and the like to create various scenarios that could affect the agency. 
Typically, they base their projections on 5,000 simulations. Obviously, under 
some conditions, the agency will take on very few claims; in others it takes 
on significant claims.24  
Figure 9 shows the distribution of projected possible outcomes in 2013 as 
reported in the PBGC’s 2003 annual report.25 All projections are expressed in 
present value terms as of 2003. The expected net position is a $18.7 billion 
deficit. In other words, future premiums are not sufficient to pay for future 
claims let alone reduce the accumulated deficit. The projected deficit 
(expressed in present value terms) is about eighteen times higher than annual 
premiums. Clearly, the variable premium rate is too low to pay for the 
insurance.  
The expected deficit, of course, is merely the average of all the positions 
that are possible ten years hence. There is a nineteen percent probability that 
the PBGC will have a sufficiently favorable experience to accumulate a 
surplus position in ten years. There is a larger probability that the deficit will 
grow far beyond the current deficit. There is a ten percent chance that the 
deficit will be at least $49 billion, a five percent chance it will be at least 
$60.3 billion and a one percent chance of being at least $82.5 billion in the 
red. By way of comparison, total assets in insured defined benefit plans at 
start of 2003 (following the equity downturn) amounted to an estimated $1 
trillion. Thus, a one-percent event would require about an eight percent tax 
on pension assets to eliminate the deficit, a prospect that may invite a 
congressional bailout of the insurance.  
 24. The model is described in detail in Steven Boyce & Richard A. Ippolito, The Cost of Pension 
Insurance, 69 J. RISK & INS. 121 (2002). 
 25. PBGC ANN. REP., supra note 23, at 11. 
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Figure 9 
Distribution of PBGC’s Potential 2013 Financial Position 
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[Source: 2003 PBGC Annual Report.] 
C. Market Premiums vs. PBGC Assessments 
In reality, the PBGC does not price according to the formula displayed at 
(11). In terms of a two-period model, the PBGC price can be written as 
follows:  
(12) *,)ˆ1( LfpKPPBGC −+=  
where K is a constant. One notable difference in (12) compared to (11) is that 
the PBGC price ignores pension asset composition; only the beginning-year 
funding ratio enters the formula. I denote this funding ratio as  because if 
the plan’s actuary declares that the plan is at the “full funding limit,” the plan 
is exempt from paying the premium, no matter how much the plan is 
underfunded. 
fˆ
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It also is notable that the PBGC sets the variable rate parameter to a 
constant, p , rather than reassessing this probability each pricing period. This 
is an important omission. Even if p  is equal to the average probability of 
bankruptcy over many years, it effectively transfers all the beta risk to the 
backers of the insurance (presumably taxpayers), who receive no risk 
premium to accept this burden. The rate also is set too low.  
In a study of pension insurance, Steven Boyce and I show that taking 
account of loopholes in the law, the PBGC effectively charges about $5 per 
$1,000 of underfunding, whereas the market cost of the insurance is about 
$25 per $1,000 of underfunding.26 About half of the market price is 
compensation for beta risk absorbed by the backers of the insurance. The 
PBGC makes up for some of this deficiency by assessing fixed assessments 
against all pensions, regardless of funding level. The K-factor in the 
expression above takes the form of a $19 assessment against each participant 
in the plan. 
D. Market Pricing Through a Self-Insurance Pool 
To understand better the risk that is offloaded to the taxpayers, suppose 
that the government terminated its role in the PBGC, and required all 
pensions to belong to a self-insurance pool. To obtain a clean start, suppose 
that the federal government handed over sufficient monies to eliminate the 
projected mean expected $18.7 billion deficit implied by its current starting 
conditions (Figure 9). The governing board of the pool would set policy and 
premiums (board members in a pool arrangement presumably are elected by 
pension plans, where votes are proportional to pension participants in each 
plan).  
To ensure its survival, the Board either assesses a charge against members 
to reflect actual claims, or resets the variable rate premium each year to 
reflect current economic conditions. In periods following poor economic 
performance, rates increase to reflect high expected rates of bankruptcy. The 
insureds themselves absorb market volatility rather than offloading it to a 
third party (namely the taxpayer). In short, they absorb the beta risk. Thus, on 
average, premiums move in tandem with economic conditions. This policy 
dramatically increases volatility of aggregate premiums but commensurately 
reduces the volatility of possible economic conditions. The only variation in 
outcome is attributable to idiosyncratic risk. In periods of below-average 
 
 
 26. See Boyce & Ippolito, supra note 24. 
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claims, a fund builds up to accommodate claims in periods of above-average 
claims. 
Figure 10 shows the difference that this change makes to the insurer’s 
projected net financial position. The bar distribution depicts the projected 
PBGC financial position ten years out under current conditions. The line 
distribution captures the outcomes when the insurance is operated like a self-
insurance pool, and the pool resets the variable rate each period to 
accommodate current market conditions. The reduction in volatility brought 
about by aggregate economic pricing is dramatic. The outcomes under this 
policy have no beta risk and evince a distribution that is more compatible 
with a private-sector insurance solution to the insurance.  
Figure 10 
Distribution of PBGC’s Potential 2013 Financial Position 
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Of course, if the pool actually were put in place then one can imagine the 
Board enacting numerous other policies to reduce the ex ante cross-subsidies 
in the current system. It is likely that pension plans that had more 
underfunding and a higher proportion of stocks would pay an appropriately 
higher price for the insurance. Those truly presenting little or no insurance 
risk would pay only nominal premiums, and so on. In other words, the pool 
itself would likely drift towards a solution that would characterize the 
insurance if it were offered in the private market. 
IX. THE UNRAVELING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS: TERMINATIONS 
FOR REVERSION 
The unraveling of defined benefit pensions had its roots in changes in law 
that occurred in the 1980s, and the spurt of terminations for reversions that 
characterized the period. In a nutshell, bankruptcy (or severe financial 
difficulty) historically was the only way for firms to obtain reversions from 
terminated plans. The rules changed in the mid 1980s, giving rise to the 
possibility that firms could unilaterally terminate plans, and take excess 
assets into corporate profits. These actions ultimately led to the unraveling of 
the defined-benefit system.27 I will show below that the two-period model of 
compensating wage differentials used above can be slightly extended to 
explain the phenomenon.  
A. Terminations for Reversion 
Plan termination traditionally signaled dire financial circumstances in the 
firm. Beginning in the early 1980s, sponsors discovered a new twist on 
termination, one seemingly designed to obtain access to excess assets for 
corporate profits. Normally, the plan sponsor is not permitted to use pension 
assets. But by terminating a plan and then recreating essentially the same 
plan, some sponsors argued that they could effectively do just that by the 
two-step termination-reestablishment process. These events became known 
as “terminations for reversions.” 
In a typical event, the firm would terminate the plan, purchasing annuities 
for their employees equal to the present value of termination benefits, L*, 
then establish an identical pension with past service credit, which recreated 
the full ongoing obligation, L. So as to not to overpay workers, they 
 27. A longer version of this argument is found in Richard A. Ippolito, Tenuous Property Rights: 
The Unraveling of Defined Benefit Contracts in the US, in PENSION POLICY IN AN INTEGRATING 
EUROPE 175 (Onorato Castellino & Elsa Fornero eds., 2003). 
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stipulated that the annuities paid in the new plan were offset dollar for dollar 
by the annuities purchased from the insurance company. This stipulation 
reduces the liabilities in the new plan to the amount, L-L*. Thus, by 
intertwining the two plans, the firm recreated the same liabilities it had prior 
to the termination. In effect, the firm effected a reversion without imposing 
capital losses on workers. Many “terminations for reversion” occurred in 
conjunction with corporate events during the 1980s. For example, excess 
assets sometimes were used to finance a leveraged buyout.  
B. Breaking the Promise 
The problem that arose for the market for defined benefit plans was that 
firms that engaged in terminations sometimes did not recreate the plan after 
termination, and instead created a defined contribution plan, effectively 
breaking the implicit pension contract. Indeed, Shleifer and Summers 
advanced the theory that the premiums affiliated with leveraged buyouts 
(“LBOs”) were attributable to the breaking of implicit contracts like 
pensions, effecting large transfers from workers and other stakeholders to 
stock holders.28 
In a study of 169 LBOs over the period 1980–1987, William James and I 
found that these firms terminated eighty-nine pensions within one year of the 
LBO. Only twenty-two were re-establishments; twenty-seven had a new 
contribution benefit plan and forty had no new plan. Consistent with other 
studies, we found that many firms in the latter group could be explained by 
plant closings and poor financial ratios.29 But we could not explain the 
defined contribution replacement events in this way, and these accounted for 
one in every three terminations. Moreover, in a control (non-LBO) sample, 
we found that one in four terminations resulted in a defined contribution 
follow-on plan. It was not obvious from looking at financial data that these 
terminations were precipitated by financial problems.30 
 28. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 29. Most studies have shown a relation between reversion events and the financial condition of 
the plan sponsor. See, e.g., Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Stock Price Response to 
Pension Terminations and the Relation of Terminations with Corporate Takeovers, 18 FIN. MGMT. 41 
(1989); H. Fred Mittelstaedt, An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Underlying the Decision to Remove 
Excess Assets from Overfunded Pension Plans, 11 J. ACCT. & ECON. 399 (1989); Mitchell A. 
Petersen, Pension Reversions and Worker-Shareholder Wealth Transfers, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1033 
(1992); Mary Stone, A Financing Explanation for Overfunded Pension Plan Terminations, 25 J. ACCT. 
RES. 317 (1987); Jacob K. Thomas, Why Do Firms Terminate Their Overfunded Pension Plans?, 11 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 361 (1989); Jack L. VanDerhei, The Effect of Voluntary Terminations of Overfunded 
Pension Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 54 J. RISK & INS. 131 (1987). 
 30. Richard A. Ippolito & William H. James, LBOs, Reversions and Implicit Contracts, 47 J. 
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C. The Internal Revenue Service Ruling 
The tax rules dating to 1938 seemingly do not allow sponsors to access 
excess assets unless there is some evidence of errors by actuaries that cause 
the firm to contribute incorrect amounts to the fund.31 Presumably, the intent 
of the language was to ensure that the pension trust fund, which was exempt 
from corporate taxation, not be used for purposes other than paying pension 
benefits.32  
While many pension terminations occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, 
they were predominantly underfunded pensions affiliated with business 
failures.33 In 1971, the IRS issued a ruling in the context of a plan that 
terminated for “business necessity.”34 The IRS apparently allowed excess 
funds beyond those required to satisfy legal obligations to be considered as 
though they were attributable to actuarial error and eligible for reversion to 
the sponsor. This ruling had little practical importance for distress 
terminations, because typically, firms in financial difficulty often defunded 
the plan of excess assets (through lower contributions) long before 
bankruptcy was encountered. Thus, prior to the 1980s, the law covering 
reversions was interpreted quite strictly, with an exception granted to firms in 
financial distress.  
In the early 1980s, the IRS issued a new ruling that dramatically altered 
the defined benefit pension contract. It announced that upon any termination, 
the plan sponsor could take excess assets into corporate profits, as long as the 
plan paid off termination benefits to workers (in the form of annuities 
purchased from an insurance company). The ruling did not appear to be 
concerned that the tax-exempt pension trust seemingly was created by 
Congress to support accumulations for the purpose of paying pension 
benefits.35 Moreover, the ruling made it clear that the reversions were legal 
even if the only purpose of the termination was to capture a reversion. 
 
 
FIN. 139 (1992). 
 31. The common understanding about reversions stems from Section 401(a)(2) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and Section 1.401-2(b)(1) of the regulations that interpret the Code. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 401(a)(2) (2000). These regulations “permit the employer . . . to recover at the termination of the 
trust, and only at such termination, any balance . . . which is due to erroneous actuarial computations.” 
26 C.F.R. § 401–2(b)(1) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 32. For a full history of reversion law, see Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans: 
History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 259 (1989). 
 33. S. REP. NO. 93–127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838. 
 34. See Rev. Rul. 71-152, 1971–1 C.B. 126 (1971). 
 35. See Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983–1 C.B. 87 (1983). 
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This ruling substantially altered the economics of the implicit pension 
contract. An implicit contract requires a bonding mechanism for both parties. 
Workers are bonded by virtue of the fact that if the firm encounters severe 
financial difficulty, then workers automatically absorb the downside default 
risk. If workers tried to escape default risk by quitting then they 
automatically forfeited the ongoing value of the pension and instead collected 
the termination value.  
For their part, firms were precluded from arbitrarily terminating the 
pension by a fairly strict tax code that prescribed the use of pension assets for 
the purpose of paying benefits. The new ruling, however, stripped the latter 
protection from the contract, and explicitly permitted a unilateral termination 
of the contract, regardless of the financial condition of the sponsor. 
D. Congressional Reaction 
Congressional reaction to the new IRS tax policy was predictable, and 
ultimately led to the enactment of a series of reversion taxes. In 1986, 
Congress enacted landmark legislation changing the corporate tax treatment 
of excess pension assets: It levied a ten percent (non-deductible) excise tax 
on reversions from defined benefit plans (known as “the reversion tax”). 
While the tax rate was modest, it signaled a major alteration in congressional 
interpretation on the ownership of excess pension assets, a signal that was 
reenforced in 1988 when the tax was increased to fifteen percent. In 1990, 
Congress affirmed the new ownership paradigm by increasing the reversion 
tax to fifty percent.36 These taxes ended the “termination-for-reversion” 
phenomenon, but spawned an even more tumultuous period for defined 
benefit plans.  
Ostensibly, the Congress was trying to recreate the “old” environment in 
which reversions effectively were precluded, but did not perfectly replicate 
the old law. The problem it created was that reversion taxes applied even if 
the firm encountered financial difficulty. Firms reacted in two ways. First, 
they reduced target funding ratios, which reduced the flows of monies into 
defined benefit plans.37 Second, they discovered a way effectively to switch 
to a defined contribution plan without triggering the reversion tax, which 
 36. If the sponsor gives twenty-five percent of the reversion to the participants (in the form of 
contributions to some other plan), the excise tax is reduced to twenty percent. The reversion also is 
subject to the normal thirty-four percent corporate tax, potentially leaving the firm only sixteen cents 
for each dollar of reversion. 
 37. For more detail on reversion taxes, see Richard A. Ippolito, Reversion Taxes, Contingent 
Benefits and the Decline in Pension Funding, 44 J.L. & ECON. 199 (2001). 
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came in the form of a new product: the so-called cash balance plan (also 
called a hybrid plan).  
The cash balance plan is created by a plan amendment to the existing 
defined benefit plan. It has the effect of awarding each participant an 
individual “account.”38 Typically, a worker’s account is credited with the 
value of the termination benefit (legally-mandated ERISA39 benefit) as of the 
date of the amendment.40 The plan guarantees a particular investment return 
on these monies that often is tied to a market instrument (for example, a 
Treasury bill rate).41 This guarantee maintains the plan’s legal status as 
“defined benefit.” Future accruals are very much like traditional defined 
contribution plans; for example, the plan might award each account x percent 
of pay for each year of service subsequent to the date of the amendment. 
Importantly, at the time of the switch to cash balance, pension assets in 
excess of the legal benefits in the old version of the plan are used to fund 
future contributions.  
In effect, the cash balance conversion allows a plan sponsor to terminate 
its defined benefit plan, and reestablish a defined contribution plan in its 
place, without triggering the reversion tax on the excess assets that result 
from the termination. The available evidence suggests that the conversions 
are an important part of what we label the “defined benefit universe.” Data 
for the 1999 Form 5500 submissions show that about twenty-two percent of 
 38. The account is a bookkeeping entry, which records the opening balance, plus new 
contributions made by the employer plus interest, but the assets backing the accounts are still held in a 
pool managed by the sponsor. The earnings credited to each account typically do not reflect actual 
earnings in the fund, but are guaranteed the interest rate as stated in the plan document. Thus, there is 
some chance that the overall fund could have less money than the sum of the “accounts.” 
 39. ERISA, or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, is the basis for much 
regulation of private pensions; it includes oversight of fiduciary, vesting, disclosure and funding 
issues, and authorizes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to provide mandatory pension 
insurance to all defined benefit plans. Termination benefits are regulated in non-forfeiture rules. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
 40. The ERISA benefit is that amount that is owed workers if the plan terminated immediately. 
Sometimes, the plan credits some participants’ accounts with something less than this amount, but if 
the employee quits, he cannot receive a benefit with a value less than his accrued benefit at the time of 
his departure. Legally, the plan does not set up individual accounts for the participants, but instead 
maintains a pooled asset account that may hold investment instruments entirely different than the 
guaranteed return stated in the plan. But the plan reports “account values” to participants as though 
they have individually owned accounts.  
 41. When the amendment is made, the sponsor calculates the present value of legal pension 
liabilities; and creates individual account balances usually in these amounts. Assets beyond these 
amounts (“excess assets”) are retained in the plan. The firm awards future contributions to each 
worker’s account on the basis of some formula (often a percent of pay). The key feature of the cash 
balance plan is that it requires only an amendment to the plan, not termination, and thus, does not 
trigger the reversion tax on excess assets in the plan. The firm can make future contributions to 
employees’ accounts from excess assets.  
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all workers covered by a defined benefit plan are in a cash-balance variety.42 
While some firms make some accommodations for older workers so as to 
diminish the magnitude of their losses, for the most part, cash balance 
conversions mimic the effect of straightforward terminations on workers’ 
pension wealth.  
X. USING THE SAME MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE DEMISE OF DEFINED 
BENEFIT PENSIONS 
The cumulative effect of terminations for reversion, and conversions to 
cash balance plans have increased the cost of the implicit pension contract.43 
The essence of this idea can be demonstrated using the simple two-period 
model from the first part of this paper. In other words, the same model that 
can explain the compensating differential for bankruptcy risks can explain 
the unraveling of the system.  
For simplicity, assume away the non-diversification risk premium. This 
means that workers reduce their willingness to pay for the pension in an 
amount equal to expected losses from bankruptcy and termination. I rewrite 
(2) here for convenience: 
(2) . ( )[ ]*1* LLpLEV −−+=
EV is the expected value of the pension to workers and the expected cost to 
the firm of providing the pension. Recall that L is the value of ongoing 
benefits, L* is the value of termination (and insured) benefits, and p is the 
probability of bankruptcy (and thus, termination). But this expression 
assumes that the principal cause of termination is bankruptcy.  
The alternation in pension rules in the 1980s created the specter that some 
firms will unilaterally terminate (or convert to cash balance) for purposes of 
exploiting the value of contingent benefits. Suppose that there are two kinds 
of firms: those that are trustworthy and those that are not. We might think of 
those in the first category as those who fear that termination might be 
unprofitable owing to negative reputation effects in the labor market and 
those in the second as firms who find it profitable to exploit the contingent 
value of workers’ pensions. Suppose that workers have a hard time knowing 
 42. This estimate is based on about fifty percent of records received for that year. The 1999 cycle 
is the first in which the questions asked whether defined benefit plans in fact are cash balance. Cash 
balance conversions are concentrated in larger plans. 
 43. This section contains numerous terms of art such as “lemons market” and “corner solution.” 
All of these concepts can be found in RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (forthcoming 
2005). 
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which firms are trustworthy and which are not, and so they form some 
expectation based on termination/cash balance activity they learn about.  
Let q denote workers’ collective assessment of the probability that the 
firm will renege on the contract. Call this “contract risk.” In order for 
workers to collect their contingent benefits, they must survive both 
bankruptcy risks, captured by the parameter, p, and contract risks, captured 
by the parameter q. Workers’ evaluation of q depends upon their estimate of 
the portion of employers that are good guys and bad guys. The expected 
value of the pension is now less than before, specifically, we have: 
(13) . ( ) [ ]*)1(1* LLqpLEVNEW −−−+=
This new calculation would not affect firms’ calculus if firms also saw the 
cost of providing the pension as EVNEW. But they do not. Trustworthy firms 
will discover that they have to pay a contract risk premium even though they 
have no intention of terminating. Oddly, untrustworthy firms benefit from the 
uncertainty. Even though a dishonest firm intends on reneging, its workers do 
not fully discount for this eventuality because they do not know if their 
employer is a “good guy” or a “bad guy,” and hence, they pay something in 
the form of lower cash wages for a pension that the firm knows will not be 
delivered.  
To make this concept concrete, consider the trustworthy firm. The cost of 
the pension is as follows:  
(14) ( )[ ]*1* LLpLEV YTRUSTWORTH −−+= . 
Since it has no intention of reneging on the contract, it does not discount the 
cost for the possibility of unilaterally terminating (so q = 0). But workers are 
only willing to pay the amount in (13) for the pension. This means that the 
trustworthy firm is stuck paying the difference between what the pension 
actually costs and the amount that its workers are willing to pay. Subtract 
(13) from (14) to find the “contract risk tax” on trustworthy firms: 
(15) . ( )[ ] 0*1 >−−= LLpqCR YTRUSTWORTH
Now consider an untrustworthy firm. It fully intends on reneging, and thus, 
sets the value of q in (13) to unity. In this case, its expected cost of providing 
the pension is simply L*:  
(16) . *LEV THYUNTRUSTWOR =
Calculate the contract risk premium for this firm the same way as above, 
namely, subtract the amount workers are willing to pay for the pension (13) 
from the cost to the untrustworthy firm (16). The result is as follows: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1251 Ippolito book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1292 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1251 
 
 
 
 
(17) ( )[ ] 0*1)1( <−−−−= LLpqCR RTHYUNTTRUSTWO , 
which is a negative number. In other words, the untrustworthy firm receives 
a sort of contract risk subsidy. They benefit from the fact that some plan 
sponsors are honest, which causes workers to reduce their assessment that 
their own employer will renege. In contrast, the existence of untrustworthy 
firms penalizes the trustworthy firms. We have the makings of a lemons 
market.  
For firms that are least trustworthy, the cost of offering defined benefit 
plans is low because workers understate the true probability of unilateral 
default. These are the most likely sponsors to continue offering the defined 
benefit plan. For firms that are most trustworthy, the cost of offering their 
defined benefit plan is high because workers overstate the true probability of 
unilateral termination, and therefore understate the true value of the plan. 
These firms are least likely to continue offering a defined benefit plan.  
As the most-trustworthy firms either terminate or convert to cash balance, 
the pool gradually becomes disproportionately populated with firms more 
likely to renege on the contract. As this process plays out, workers covered 
by defined benefit plans in the aggregate increase their collective estimate of 
q, a process that pushes the market closer to a corner solution. 
To a trustworthy firm, the problem manifests itself in a growing 
perception that the generous pension plan it is offering seems to be heavily 
discounted by its covered workers. Workers, it will seem, attach more value 
to defined contribution pensions. As this wedge grows, the net benefits of 
offering the defined benefit variety become smaller. Put simply, if workers 
act as though the firm is less trustworthy than it really is, then the only 
profitable option for the firm is to fulfill its workers’ expectations, by simply 
reneging on the promise. Once the firm defaults on its implicit contract, it has 
only one option: namely to offer a defined contribution or cash balance plan, 
which effectively are bonded. In other words, if workers believe that the firm 
is not trustworthy, then it will be. 
A. Factors that Can Preserve Some Coverage 
The only way in which the unraveling process can find equilibrium with a 
positive share of defined benefit coverage is for plan sponsors that are 
trustworthy to be able to convey their unusually high trustworthiness to 
employees, which is problematic if other firms with similar characteristics 
have either terminated their plans or converted to cash balance. Additionally, 
even if the firm is trustworthy, the question naturally arises whether the firm 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/1
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will be subject to a change in corporate ownership in which case it might not 
be trustworthy next period. 
Some bond is required to enforce the sponsor’s part of the contract. There 
are two obvious ways in which this can be done. First, unions can maintain 
their pensions because they are protected by explicit collective bargaining 
agreements, making it costly for the firm to renege.44 Figure 11 gives the 
composition of covered workers under defined benefit plans in 2001 
(estimated). About twenty-two percent of these workers are in the cash 
balance variety. Among those still covered by the traditional variety of 
defined benefit plans, about half are in plans subject to collective bargaining 
agreements.45  
Figure 11 
Defined Benefit Plans: 2001 
Distribution of Covered Workers
Traditional Plans 
Subject to 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Contracts
40%
Traditional Plans 
Covering Non-
Union Workers
38%
Cash Balance
22%
 
[Source: 2001 Form 5500 Annual Reports.] 
 
 
 44. Absent binding language, if the firm and union allow an agreement to expire, without 
replacing it in the interim, then technically, the firm might be able to terminate the pension. 
Presumably, the union could react in ways that could make this action costly for the firm. These events 
are exceedingly rare. 
 45. These counts include coverage in multiemployer plans.  
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Second, in the public sector, defined benefit plans could be terminated, 
but presumably, if sufficient numbers of voters are public employees, and if 
they care intensely about the pension issue, a mechanism exists to effectively 
bond the pension. Defined benefit plans continue to dominate coverage of 
public employees at all levels of government.46  
A third group presumably is comprised of firms that either have found 
ways to communicate their trustworthiness to workers, or they tolerate the 
contract risk “tax” because defined benefit plans are unusually valuable to 
them. 
The most effective way to create a bond is simply to use a defined 
contribution plan. In these plans, vesting can be immediate (and often is). 
Workers effectively own their accounts, which means that they own all 
contributions plus earnings; and often, workers are given discretion on the 
portfolio composition of their accounts. When they depart the firm, workers 
usually take the lump sum in their accounts (which can be rolled over into an 
Individual Retirement Account). Put simply, the main attribute of defined 
contribution plans that distinguishes them from their defined benefit 
counterparts is that workers own the pension assets. In effect, defined 
contribution plans are the ultimate solution to the unraveling of the implicit 
pension contract, because they offer perfect bonding of the pension promise.  
If firms want to continue exposing workers to adverse downside financial 
experience, it could install a stock bonus plan with provisions for 
diversification with accumulating service. This option reproduces worker 
losses as shown in Figure 3. Importantly, however, while this option still 
poses non-diversifiable risk on workers, it is free of contract risk. Workers 
absorb losses only if the market price of the stock falls. They are immune 
from ex post reneging problems that beset defined benefit plans. This means 
that workers’ required differential for accepting this plan is smaller than for a 
defined benefit plan with the same loss profile over service. 
XI. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN PENSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
BANKRUPTCY LOSSES 
What is the future of bankruptcy losses for workers? For the foreseeable 
future, the kinds of pension losses depicted above will be pertinent for 
workers who continue to be covered by defined benefit plans. But these 
workers represent a far smaller portion of covered workers than they did 
twenty years ago. In the early 1980s, more than eighty percent of covered 
 46. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1998 (2000). 
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workers in the private sector were covered solely by a defined benefit plan. 
Since then, there has been a dramatic shift towards defined contribution 
plans, most notably the 401k variety. These plans allow workers to 
voluntarily contribute to their accounts. Employers often match these 
contributions on x-to-one basis up to some predetermined limit. 
A. Pension Coverage Patterns 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of coverage in the private workforce in 
1980 versus 1998. The overall pension coverage rate is a little less than fifty 
percent in both periods.47 In 1980, defined benefit plans cover thirty-eight 
percent of private workers and eighty-two percent of covered workers. By 
1998, the picture is dramatically different. Traditional defined benefit plans 
cover only about sixteen percent of private workers, and only about one-third 
of covered workers. Traditional (non-401k) defined contribution plans cover 
eight-to-nine percent of private workers in both periods. 401k plans and cash 
balance plans, both of which did not exist in 1980, cover almost half of all 
pension-covered workers in 1998.48 Virtually all defined contribution plans 
are portable and free of contract risk. They are not, however, necessarily free 
of bankruptcy risk. 
Bankruptcy-risk exposure does not come primarily from stock bonus 
plans, which are not widely used,49 but instead from employee ownership of 
company stock in their 401k pensions. Sometimes, employer matches to 
employee contributions are paid in the form of company stock, but 
participants in some plans also can choose to purchase company stock with 
their own contributions.  
 47. More than fifty percent of workers ultimately obtain pension coverage, but cross section 
observations include young workers who often opt for jobs that do not offer pensions. As they age, 
workers tend to gravitate towards pension-covered jobs. 
 48. These data are found in PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, ABSTRACT OF 1998 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS (2001–2002). 
 49. Only two or three percent of workers have a stock bonus plan or an employee stock 
ownership plan. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE U.S., 2000 (2003). 
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Figure 12 
Primary Pension Plan Coverage In The Private Sector, 1980 vs. 1998* 
1980
No Pension
54%
Non 401k DC 
Plans
8%
Traditional Defined 
Benefit Plans
38%
1998
401k Plans
18%
Non 401K DC 
Plans
9%
No Pension
52%
Traditional Defined 
Benefit Plans
16%
Cash Balance Plans
5%
 
* The charts reflect primary coverage only. About thirty-five percent of covered workers 
have a second pension plan. 
[Source: PENSION & WELFARE BENEFIT ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, U.S. 
DEPT OF LABOR, ABSTRACT OF 1998 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS (2001–2002).] 
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B. Company Stock Holdings in 401k Plans 
Overall, about forty-one percent of participants in 401k plans have either 
the opportunity to purchase company stock in their plans, or the employer 
matches their contributions in the form of company stock (or both). Within 
these accounts, company stock comprises about thirty percent of the 
portfolios on average (including both employee contributions and company 
matches).50 
Figure 13 gives the overall distribution of participants in 401k plans. 
Fifty-nine percent of employees do not have a plan that provides for 
company stock. Another fourteen percent of covered workers have the option 
to purchase company stock, but hold none. Thus, seventy-three percent of 
401k accounts have no company stock. Another eight percent have less than 
twenty percent of their holdings in this form. This leaves about one in five 
401k plans that have more than twenty percent of their accounts exposed to 
bankruptcy risk, and about half of these stand to lose from fifty to one 
hundred percent of their balances if their employer enters bankruptcy.  
In short, while most 401k accounts have little or no bankruptcy risk, a 
non-trivial portion of the 401k universe is substantially invested in the stock 
of their own employer. Given the variance is a single stock holding, some of 
the workers with concentrated accounts will gain unusual retirement wealth; 
and some may encounter a serious downside event, including the possibility 
that their employer will enter bankruptcy.  
In the Enron Corporation, which entered bankruptcy in 2001, about sixty 
percent of 401k assets were invested in company stock, but only about eleven 
percent stemmed from company match amounts in the form of Enron stock. 
The rest were employee-directed investments in the stock.51 Enron 
employees lost almost ninety-nine percent of the value of their portfolios.  
Enron is not the only company to sponsor a 401k plan that is heavily 
invested in company stock. The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) 
recently compiled a list of twenty-five companies in which the 401k plans 
were comprised of more than fifty percent invested in company stock.52 I 
reproduce the list in Table 1. Four of these companies have no defined 
benefit plan, implying that the 401k plan is the major source of retirement 
funds for covered employees.  
 50. All the 401k information is taken from Jack L. VanDerhei, The Role of Company Stock in 
401k Plans, 5 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1 (2002). 
 51. See PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RES. SERVICE, THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYER 
STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANS (2002). 
 52. Id. 
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Figure 13 
401k Accounts by Share of Company Stock, 2000 
Participant Distribution
Zero
14%
20% or Less
8%
21% to 50%
8%
51% to 100%
11%
No Company 
Stock in Plan
59%
Plans with 
Company Stock
 
[Source: Jack VanDerhei, The Role of Company Stock in 401k Plans, 5 RISK MGMT. & INS. 
REV., 1 (2002).] 
Equally interesting, however, the numbers suggest that my portrayal of 
bankruptcy risks among employees covered by defined benefit plans could in 
some cases be substantially underestimated. If employees covered by defined 
benefit plans also have a diversified 401k plan then their overall bankruptcy 
risk is somewhat attenuated. But if their secondary 401k plan is heavily 
invested in company stock, as are those in the CRS list, the effects of 
bankruptcy are leveraged by impending losses in the 401k accounts. 
C. Magnitude of Potential Losses in Non-Diversified 401k Plans 
It is useful to put these statistics in perspective. Sixteen percent of 
workers were exposed to bankruptcy risk owing to termination of their 
defined benefit plans in 1998.53 While the data in Figure 13 refer to all 401k 
 
 
 53. See supra fig.12 (bottom chart). 
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plans, and not just to those that are the primary plan, suppose that the 
distribution of company stock is reasonably representative of primary plans. 
In this case, since eighteen percent of workers are covered primarily by a 
401k plan in 199854 then we can say that about twenty percent of these, or 
about four percent of workers are exposed to significant bankruptcy risk 
because they are heavily invested in company stock in their 401k plans. This 
is only one-fourth the number potentially affected by bankruptcy in 
companies that sponsor defined benefit plans, though some workers covered 
by defined benefit plans are exposed to bankruptcy risks in their secondary 
401k plans.  
While the overall exposure levels attributable to 401k company stock 
holdings may not affect as many participants as those covered by defined 
benefit plans, the loss profile in any plan with holdings concentrated in 
company stock is more severe for older workers. In defined benefit plans, a 
progressively larger share of workers’ ongoing benefits are insured once 
workers get beyond their middle service years. In 401k plans concentrated in 
company stock, the losses continue to accumulate with years of service (as in 
Figure 2). Thus, while older workers in defined benefit plans are more or less 
insulated from bankruptcy risk, they are vulnerable to a catastrophic loss in a 
plan fully invested in company stock. There is no evidence that workers in 
their fifties are any less concentrated in company stock in their 401k plans 
than younger workers.55  
The amounts at stake in 401k plans are non-trivial. For workers in their 
fifties who have at least twenty years of tenure, average 401k balances were 
about $125,000 in 2002. Since 401k plans were not in operation until 1981, 
balances for future cohorts in this age range likely will be higher. Thus, 401k 
balances can approximate the amount required to support the typical defined 
benefit pension.56 And clearly, the magnitude of 401k losses in bankruptcy 
can substantially exceed those in defined benefit plans for older workers. 
One attenuating factor is that 401k plans that have large portions of 
company stock tend to be concentrated in large companies. Most of the 
companies in Table 1, for example, are large well-known companies that 
have survived over long periods. The list is not anomalous. VanDerhei 
 54. See supra fig.12. 
 55. See VanDerhei, supra note 50.  
 56. The average new retiree for male beneficiaries paid by the PBGC is about $625 per month. 
At a six percent interest rate, one needs about $100,000 to purchase this annuity. Alternatively, 
consider a relatively generous defined benefit plan that pays 1.5 percent of final wage times years of 
service. Then a worker earning $40,000 with twenty-five years of service earns an annual annuity of 
$15,000. At six percent, the amount required to support these payments is about $200,000. Actual and 
projected 401k balances are easily within this range. 
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reports that even though forty-one percent of all 401k participants have the 
opportunity to invest in company stock, only three percent of all 401k plans 
have any company stock. This implies that, for the most part, only very large 
companies match in company stock and/or permit company stock as an 
option. Bankruptcy risks in large firms are not zero, but they are dramatically 
lower than those that characterize small firms.57 
D. Employment Risks 
Whether employment risks will be lower for future cohorts is a larger 
unknown. If workers become more mobile in future periods, meaning that 
their skills are more freely transferable across firms, then not only will 
pension losses fall for participants holding diversified portfolios in their 401k 
plans, so too will employment losses. Transferable skills essentially mean 
that wages in alternative jobs that displaced workers might find are not 
necessarily lower than in their current jobs. 
Workers that remain diversified in their 401k plans and accumulate skills 
that are transferable to other firms do not have the non-diversifiable risk that 
has characterized past cohorts. To the extent that future workers will have 
less firm-specific investments of all kinds, they will look more like all other 
stakeholders in the firm. They will have some small stake in current 
employment, but they are not seriously harmed by the bankruptcy of one 
particular employer.  
This development, if it happens, does not come free. If workers’ lifetime 
wage income does not importantly depend on the success of their employer 
then the agency problem that now characterizes most stockholders will now 
also characterize workers and firm productivity may fall. In the extreme, 
workers will have about as much interest in the success of the firm as does 
the typical holder of a stock index fund that holds a small percentage in a 
large number of firms. It also remains to be seen whether the amount of 
retirement income delivered by defined benefit plans will be replicated in 
future cohorts who depend increasingly on the management of their own 
monies.  
 57. Bankruptcy risks by size are reported in Boyce & Ippolito, supra note 24. 
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XII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Owing to the principle of diversification, most stakeholders in firms are 
not importantly affected by bankruptcy of a particular firm. Workers are an 
important exception. Upon the bankruptcy of their employer, most workers 
cannot match their current pay in a new firm, and likely will suffer some bout 
of unemployment. Even if the firm survives, future wage projections likely 
will be lower. In addition, workers covered by defined benefit plans stand to 
lose substantial pension wealth. Chapter Seven bankruptcies almost always 
trigger a pension termination. They often occur in Chapter Eleven events as 
well.  
Workers will not choose employment in a firm that promises substantial 
losses upon the event of firm failure without adequate compensation. The 
firm must pay a risk premium to attract labor from a more secure vocation, 
for example in the government sector. In this sense, the possibility that these 
workers might encounter the downside of their concentrated investment in 
one particular firm does not pose any special public policy issue. If the 
taxpayers think, however, that poor older workers will be successful in 
obtaining bailouts ex post then it might be prudent to institute an insurance 
system up front that requires the stakeholders to pay at least part of the costs.  
Presumably, the ex post prospects are the genesis for some federal 
insurance programs that limit bankruptcy losses for workers. Federal 
unemployment insurance provides some cushion against employment loss. 
Mandatory federal pension insurance offered by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation reduces pension losses in defined benefit plans. While 
the financing of the PBGC is inadequate and requires reform, from the 
workers’ perspective, it more or less insulates them from loss of pension 
wealth late in their career. Workers mid career absorb losses that are 
substantial, perhaps on the order of two times annual wage, but this loss can 
be amortized over a reasonably long remaining work life.  
Future bankruptcy risks might be considerably different than those that 
have affected workers in the past. There has been a sharp movement away 
from defined benefit plans in favor of pensions that confer ownership of 
assets to workers themselves. 401k plans in particular and cash balance plans 
to a lesser extent have come to dominate the pension market. While most 
employees maintain diversified 401k plans, some do not. To the extent that 
workers choose to invest heavily in the stock of their employer, they not only 
will reproduce the bankruptcy risks inherent in defined benefit plans, they 
will dramatically increase them, especially in the case of older workers. A 
fifty-five-year-old worker with a 401k portfolio concentrated in employer 
stock can encounter catastrophic losses with only a short future work career 
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to offset them, a prospect made more daunting by employment losses that 
often accompany bankruptcies.  
Moreover, since the risks generated by employees’ own decisions to over 
invest in company stock is self-imposed, there is no reason to believe that the 
market will compensate them for holding it. If the government is willing to 
let these individuals suffer the consequences of their acts then there are no 
implications for public policy. If not, one might think that some minimum 
amount of diversification in the 401k accounts might be prudent to control 
the magnitude of bankruptcy losses affecting older workers.58 
Table 1: Employer Stock in Selected 401k Plans 
Company Name Company Stock as a % or 401k assets 
Does company have a 
defined benefit plan? 
Procter & Gamble 91.5 No 
Anheuser-Busch 81.6 Yes 
Coca-Cola 81.0 Yes 
Abbott Laboratories 80.0 Yes 
General Electric 77.4 Yes 
William Wrigley, Jr. 75.0 Yes 
Pfizer 74.8 Yes 
Home Depot 72.0 No 
BB&T (Branch Banking and Trust) 69.6 Yes 
Texas Instruments 69.0 Yes 
Duke Energy 67.9 Yes 
Textron 65.0 Yes 
Reliant Energy 64.5 Yes 
Kroger 63.6 Yes 
Southern Company 62.8 Yes 
ExxonMobil 62.0 Yes 
Household International 61.4 Yes 
Sherwin-Williams 59.1 Yes 
BellSouth 57.9 Yes 
Merck 57.5 Yes 
Williams 57.0 Yes 
 
 
 58. A restriction that can affect 401k plans in no way prevents workers from purchasing 
company stock outside the pension in their non-pension portfolios. 
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Company Name Company Stock as a % or 401k assets 
Does company have a 
defined benefit plan? 
McDonald’s 56.8 No 
TXU (Texas Utilities) 56.3 Yes 
Dell Computer 53.4 No 
Ford Motor Company 50.2 Yes 
[Source: PURCELL, supra note 51, at 4.] 
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